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TORT LAW
I. COURT DEFINES TEST FOR IMPOSING TORT LIABILITY ON PUBLIC
OFFICIALS FOR ALLEGED BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY
In Rayfield v. South Carolina Department of Corrections' the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff could not recover
in a wrongful death action against the Department of Corrections and
the Department of Parole and Community Corrections based on the
alleged negligence of officers of the two departments in performing
their statutorily created public duties. The court affirmed the decision
of the trial court, which granted summary judgment to the defendants
based on the theory that the defendants owed no duty to the
plaintiffs.
2
On May 20, 1983, Cecil Lucas murdered Billie and Evelyn Ray-
field.3 Lucas broke into the Rayfields' home and committed the act less
than twenty-four hours after the Department of Parole had released
him from prison. The victims apparently were chosen at random. Lu-
cas neither knew nor had any prior connection with the Rayfields.4
The Parole Board released Lucas, who was serving a two year sen-
tence for grand larceny and escape, fourteen months before his sen-
tence expired. The administrator of the Rayfields' estates brought a
negligence claim against the Department of Corrections for its failure
to inform the Parole Board of the following pertinent facts: (1) Lucas'
history of drug abuse and violent behavior during a prior incarceration,
and (2) accounts of his recent misconduct in prison. The administrator
claimed Lucas was released because the Parole Board did not have this
information when making its decision. The administrator further
claimed that Lucas' past acts made the murder foreseeable and that
his release created the opportunity for him to commit the act.5
The court first reaffirmed the established principle that absent
some special relationship, one ordinarily has no duty to protect an-
other from harm not caused by one's own wrongful acts.6 Thus, the
1. 297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 379
S.E.2d 133 (1989).
2. Id. at 98, 374 S.E.2d at 912.
3. See State v. Lucas, 285 S.C. 37, 328 S.E.2d 63, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012
(1985).
4. Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 98, 374 S.E.2d at 912.
5. Id. at 99-100, 374 S.E.2d at 912-13.
6. Id. at 100, 374 S.E.2d at 913.
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court held that the corrections and parole officers had no common-law
duty to protect the Rayfields from Cecil Lucas after he was released
from prison.7 Although the administrator conceded that no common-
law duty was owed to the Rayfields, he argued that the officers had a
special duty to the Rayfields based on their statutory duty to maintain
records on prisoners and investigate cases prior to granting parole."
The court held that none of the statutes cited by the Plaintiff cre-
ated a special duty to the Rayfields.9 Relying on prior South Carolina
cases, the court outlined the basic prerequisites to recovery in negli-
gence based on a statutory duty.10 First, the plaintiff must show "that
7. Id. at 101, 374 S.E.2d at 913. The court cited Sharpe v. South Carolina Dep't of
Mental Health, 292 S.C. 11, 18, 354 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Ct. App. 1987) (Bell, J., concurring),
writ dismissed by, 294 S.C. 469, 366 S.E.2d 12 (1988), in support of this rule. In Sharpe
the court held the Department of Mental Health was under no duty to warn the general
public of a psychiatric patient's potential for violent behavior. Sharpe, 292 S.C. at 15,
354 S.E.2d at 780.
8. Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 101, 107, 374 S.E.2d at 913, 916-17. The specific statutes
cited and allegations advanced by the administrator included:
(1) the Executive Director of the Parole Board, by presenting inadequate
records to the Board, breached his statutory duty to manage and control the
affairs of the Department, [see S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-220 (Law. Co-op.
1989)];
(2) the Commissioner of Paroles and Pardons breached his statutory duty
to assure that an appropriate case and investigation are prepared for the Pa-
role Board when it meets to consider paroling a prisoner, [see S.C. CODE ANN. §
24-21-14 (Law. Co-op. 1989)];
(3) the Commissioner of Corrections breached his statutory duty to keep a
record of the industry, habits and deportment of Lucas and to furnish it to the
Parole Board upon request, [see S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-70 (Law. Co-op.
1989)];
(4) the Warden of Central Correctional Institution breached his statutory
duties to keep a record of the industry, habits, and deportment of Lucas and to
furnish the Board with such information as will enable it to pass intelligently
on applications for parole, [see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-21-60 to -70 (Law. Co-op.
1989)];
(5) the Corrections Officers and supervisors who had custody and control
of Lucas breached their statutory duties to keep a record of his industry, hab-
its, and deportment or to supervise their subordinates in the proper keeping of
such records, [see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-21-60 to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1989)];
(6) the members of the Parole Board breached their statutory duty to
oversee, manage, and control the records as mandated by statute, [see S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 24-21-13, -14, -60, -70, -210, -220 (Law. Co-op. 1989)].
Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 107, 374 S.E.2d at 416-17.
9. Id. at 108, 374 S.E.2d at 917.
10. Id. at 101-03, 374 S.E.2d at 913-14. The court cited Clifford v. Southern Ry., 87
S.C. 324, 69 S.E. 513 (1910) and Hutto v. Southern Ry., 100 S.C. 181, 84 S.E. 719 (1915),
as illustrative of these principles. In Clifford the court found the railroad owed a duty to
a plaintiff crossing the tracks when a state statute required the train to signal its ap-
proach. In contrast, the court in Hutto found the railroad owed no duty to a plaintiff to
[Vol. 41
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the essential purpose of the statute is to protect from the kind of harm
the plaintiff has suffered."'1 Second, the plaintiff must be "a member
of the class of persons the statute is intended to protect."" Once met,
these requirements establish a case of negligence per se.
Using this framework, the court then addressed the public duty
rule. Characterizing the rule as an element of the plaintiff's case and a
doctrine distinct from the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity,"3
the court fashioned a six-element test to determine if a public official
has a special duty to a plaintiff based on a statute. 4 The court stated
that a special duty exists if the following criteria are met:
(1) an essential purpose of the statute is to protect against a particu-
lar kind of harm; (2) the statute, either directly or indirectly, imposes
on a specific public officer a duty to guard against or not to cause that
harm; (3) the class of persons the statute intends to protect is identifi-
able before the fact; (4) the plaintiff is a person within the protected
class; (5) the public officer knows or has reason to know of the likeli-
hood of harm to members of the class if he fails to do his duty; and
(6) the officer is given sufficient authority to act in the circumstances
or he undertakes to act in the exercise of his office.'"
Applying this test to the Rayfield case, the court held that the
essential purpose of the statutes cited by the plaintiff was to facilitate
the "internal functioning" of the Department of Corrections and the
Department of Parole.' The incidental usefulness of the statute in
protecting the public was not sufficient to create a special duty.
The court likewise disposed of the administrator's argument that
correction officers' knowledge of Lucas' drug addiction created a spe-
cial duty. While acknowledging that the Department may have owed
some duty of care to others to prevent foreseeable harm while Lucas
was in custody, the court concluded that duty ended when Lucas was
paroled.'7
signal its approach when the plaintiff was situated in a field near the crossing. In Hutto
the plaintiff's location was incidental to the train passing without warning, when the
train's passing frightened the plaintiff's horse and caused the animal to jerk the plaintiff
across his plowstock.
11. Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 103, 374 S.E.2d at 914.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 105-06, 374 S.E.2d at 916 (citing O'Neal v. Carolina Farm Supply, Inc.,
279 S.C. 490, 309 S.E.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1983) (distinguishing affirmative and negative
defenses)).
14. Id. at 106, 374 S.E.2d at 916.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 108, 374 S.E.2d at 917.
17. Id. at 109-10, 374 S.E.2d at 918; see Sharpe v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental
Health, 292 S.C. 11, 354 S.E.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1987) (Bell, J., concurring), writ dismissed
by, 294 S.C. 469, 366 S.E.2d 12 (1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-320
1989]
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Rayfield sets forth a concise test for determining when a statuto-
rily created public duty gives rise to a special duty to a particular
plaintiff. The opinion draws a precise distinction between public duty
and sovereign immunity.' Prior to Rayfield, this distinction was
blurred. In Patel v. McIntyre0 the district court, relying on Parker v.
Brown,'20 concluded that South Carolina had fused public versus pri-
vate duty and discretionary versus ministerial function immunity anal-
yses.2 This case implicitly confines discretionary versus ministerial
function analysis to the issue of sovereign immunity.
2
2
Using the elements outlined in Rayfield, a plaintiff seeking
recovery based on a statutory duty must first establish a special duty
based on the facts of his particular case. Absent evidence of a special
duty, the issue of sovereign immunity, and its accompanying discre-
tionary versus ministerial'function analysis, need not be addressed.
Sandra L.W. Miller
II. "EcoNoMIC Loss RULE" PRECLUDES TORT ACTION BY PURCHASERS
AGAINST NON-VENDOR BUILDER WHOSE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE CAUSED
ONLY DIMINUTION IN PROPERTY VALUES
2 3
In Carolina Winds Owners' Association v. Joe Harden Builder,
(1965).
18. See Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 105-06, 374 S.E.2d at 916.
19. 667 F. Supp. 1131 (D.S.C. 1987), affd, 848 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1988).
20. 195 S.C. 35, 10 S.E.2d 625 (1940).
21. Patel, 667 F. Supp. at 1138. The Patel court relied on Parker because of the
court's discussion in that case of the importance of retaining public officer discretion in
the context of the public duty versus private duty rule. Id. at 1138-39. In Patel Judge
Henderson used the discretionary nature of a police officer's failure to arrest an intoxi-
cated driver to support a finding that the officer had no special duty to individuals in-
jured by the driver's actions. The driver apparently caused an accident just after the
officer had stopped to help him when he ran his car off the road. See id. at 1142-43.
22. A ministerial duty is absolute. It involves "execution of a specific duty arising
from fixed and designated facts." Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 568, 197 S.E.2d 659,
662 (1973). A discretionary (or quasi-judicial) duty requires "the exercise of reason in the
adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act
shall be done or the course pursued." Id. Under common law a public official was im-
mune from tort liability based on the performance or non-performance of discretionary
acts unless the official was "guilty of corruption, or bad faith, or influenced by malicious
motives." Id. at 569, 197 S.E.2d at 662; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988) (providing sovereign immunity for quasi-judicial and discretionary acts by
government employer).
23. Just prior to final printing of this survey issue, the South Carolina Supreme
Court effectively overruled the principle of the case discussed herein. See Kennedy v.
Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co.,*No. 22824, slip op. at 16 (S.C. Sept. 25, 1989). A discus-
[Vol. 41
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Inc.24 the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that an action will
not lie in tort for negligent construction when there has been no per-
sonal injury or damage to other property of the plaintiff. When the
only damage is diminution in the value of the product itself, in this
case a building, then the plaintiffs remedy lies in contract. The court
thus adopted the "economic loss rule" as the law of South Carolina.25
This rule, and the restrictions on recovery for breach of warranty of
habitability articulated in Arvai v. Shaw,26 effectively bar direct ac-
tions against builders by purchasers of defectively built residences
when the builder is not the vendor, unless personal injury or other
damage to property occurs.
The court in Carolina Winds faced a fairly common fact situation.
Purchasers of units in a newly constructed condominium development
found their walls almost falling down around them when bricks on the
building's exterior began to crack and buckle. The condominium devel-
oper, Plaza Development Services, took action against Harden, the
prime contractor under the construction contract.2 7 The owners' associ-
ation also filed suit against Harden, the masonry subcontractor, the
architect, and the surety. The association's action was based on the
following two theories: (1) breach of the implied warranty of fitness for
intended use, and (2) negligent construction. The trial judge granted
the defendants' motions for dismissal and the court of appeals
affirmed.
2 8
The supreme court's decision in Arvai v. Shaw precludes a pur-
chaser's recovery against a builder for breach of warranty of fitness for
intended use,"' unless the builder is also the vendor of the property.2 0
Since Harden and Baker Masonry were not vendors of the condomin-
ium units, they were not liable to the owners on an implied warranty
theory.
The negligent construction claim presented a more difficult ques-
tion. In Rogers v. Scyphers1 the South Carolina Supreme Court al-
sion of this decision and its effect on South Carolina law will appear in the 1990 Annual
Survey of South Carolina Law, South Carolina Law Review.
24. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App.), aff'd per curiam on reh'g, slip op. at 21
(S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988) (court intended not to publish Order on Rehearing and
thus assigned it no opinion number).
25. See id. at 89, 374 S.E.2d at 906.
26. 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986).
27. See Plaza Dev. Servs. v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 294 S.C. 430, 365 S.E.2d 231
(Ct. App. 1988).
28. Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 76, 374 S.E.2d at 899.
29. See Arvai, 289 S.C. at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 717. "Warranty of fitness for intended
use" and "warranty of habitability" were treated as synonymous terms by the court.
30. Id., 345 S.E.2d at 716.
31. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
1989]
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lowed a cause of action for negligent construction that resulted in
physical injury. The court argued that the modern trend of the law was
to hold "building contractors. . liable for injuries to, or the death of,
third persons occurring after the completion of the work and accept-
ance by the owner. '32 The court cited with approval section 353 of the
Restatement of Torts, which specifically refers to the duties of vendors
of property.3 3 The supreme court then merged these two concepts and
articulated the duties of builder/vendors in situations in which physi-
cal injury has resulted from defective construction.
Another South Carolina Supreme Court decision, Edward's of
Byrnes Downs v. Charleston Sheet Metal Co.,34 allowed a cause of ac-
tion in tort for negligent construction that caused damage to property
adjacent to a construction site. A roofing contractor's delay in finishing
a roof allowed water to flow into a neighboring store. The court deter-
mined that the damage "resulted from the negligent failure of defend-
ant to properly perform its contract for the installation of the roof."' 3 5
Based on these authorities, it is clear that the South Carolina Su-
preme Court is willing to impose on builder/vendors a duty to perform
construction contracts so as to guard against injuries to third persons.
Similarly, builders are charged with a duty to perform their contracts
so as to avoid damages to the property of third persons. The court of
appeals in Carolina Winds, however, refused to extend a builder's duty
beyond the holdings in Rogers and Edward's. Under Carolina Winds
builders do not have a duty to third persons to perform their contracts
so that the final product is not defective. Their liability for damage to
the product is governed by the terms of the contract and extends only
to parties to the construction contract, not to third persons.
While this is a fine distinction, it is one that has been followed
32. Id. at 132, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
33, Id. at 133, 161 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 353 (3d ed.
1934)). Section 353 reads:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condi-
tion whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons
on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land with
the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the
condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know the condition of the
risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes
or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee
will discover the condition or realize the risk.
RESTATEMENT oF ToRTs § 353 (3d ed. 1934).
34. 253 S.C. 537, 172 S.E.2d 120 (1970).
35. Id. at 542-43, 172 S.E.2d at 122.
[Vol. 41
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fairly consistently in other jurisdictions."8 One criticism of the rule is
that it seems absurd to wait until someone is physically injured to hold
a contractor responsible for conduct which could result in injury. The
court in Carolina Winds stated, however, that the buyer does not have
to suffer physical injury before seeking a remedy for defective con-
struction, since he has an action against the vendor for breach of the
warranty of fitness."8 The original vendor, in turn, has an action
against the contractor for breach of the implied warranty of workman-
like performance.39 The remedy is in contract, not tort.
40
What the court failed to mention, however, and what prevents this
remedy from providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of slip-
shod construction, is that almost every construction contract contains
an arbitration clause. These clauses, which have been upheld consist-
ently by the courts,41 usually result in less than full recovery for the
cost of repair. Because of these clauses, developers generally cannot
implead the contractor when charged with breach of the implied war-
ranty of fitness for intended use. Purchasers are left with an action
against a developer who in turn can only recover under an arbitration
clause. When the developer is underinsured or financially unstable, the
purchaser's contractual remedy usually will not cover the cost of
36. See Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 89 n.12, 374 S.E.2d at 906 n.12. The court
listed cases from twenty-two jurisdictions, all decided within the past 10 years, to sup-
port its claim that the "economic loss rule" is in tune with recent developments in prod-
ucts liability law. Id. But see Council of Co-owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whit-
ing-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986) (allowing action in tort
against builder and architect when defective construction creates serious risk of death or
personal injury); Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So.
2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing action against developer for negligent per-
formance of a contractual duty to recover economic loss). For a discussion of the histori-
cal development of the economic loss theory, see Barrett, Recovery of Economic Loss in
Tort for Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C.L. REV. - (1989).
37. See Atlantis Condominium, 308 Md. at 34-35, 517 A.2d at 345.
38. Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 86, 374 S.E.2d at 904.
39. Id. at 84, 374 S.E.2d at 903. The question left open after Carolina Winds is
whether, in the absence of privity, the contractor's implied warranty of workmanlike per-
formance will extend to purchasers of newly constructed buildings. On rehearing, the
court expressly declined to rule on this question, since it had not been raised in the
pleadings or argued in the court below. See Carolina Winds, slip op. at 21 (S.C. Ct. App.
Nov. 30, 1988) (unpublished Order on Rehearing).
40. See id. at 86-87, 374 S.E.2d at 905. The court argued that until an actual injury
has occurred, allowing recovery in tort for a mere risk of personal injury would work "a
radical, and wholly unwarranted change in the elements of negligence law." Id. at 87, 374
S.E.2d at 905. In such a case both the fact of damage and the amount would be uncer-
tain. Moreover, as the court said, "there is no principled way to categorize types or de-
grees of risk for the purpose of establishing liability." Id. at 88, 374 S.E.2d at 905.
41. See, e.g., Plaza Dev. Servs. v. Joe Harden Builder, Inc., 294 S.C. 430, 434, 365
S.E.2d 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1988).
19891
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repairs.
Also not addressed by the court in Carolina Winds is the issue of
how far courts will carry the "product" analogy. In theory, purchasers
should still have an action for negligent construction if that negligent
construction causes damage to other property of the purchaser.42 In
other words, if a roof leaks after having been negligently installed, and
damage results to walls and floors, then the purchaser should be able
to recover in tort since there would be injury to "other" property.43 If
the building is viewed as an aggregation of separate products (a plausi-
ble theory since different parts of buildings are constructed by differ-
ent subcontractors), then an action in negligence should lie in the leak-
ing roof situations.
If, however, the building is considered to be one product, the eco-
nomic loss rule may bar a tort action. The Carolina Winds court dis-
cussed the economic loss rule as applied in a products liability action,
stating, "The plaintiff's remedy lies in contract, whether the loss re-
sults from inferior quality of the product, its unfitness for an intended
use, its deterioration, or its destruction by reason of the defect."' 44 The
possible implications of this reasoning, when strictly applied, are far-
reaching. For example, what result if defective electrical wiring causes
a fire which destroys a newly constructed home before the owner
moves in? Would the owner's only remedy be an action in warranty
against the vendor? This would seem to be the result if the home is
considered a single product. Whether the South Carolina courts will
follow this line of reasoning, however, is still an open question.
Susan M. Glenn
III. LITERAL ACCUSATION OF CRIME NOT REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH
SLANDER PER SE
In Mains v. K Mart Corp.'5 the South Carolina Court of Appeals
addressed a recurring issue in slander per se actions: Can a party mak-
ing only indirect accusations be held liable for slander per se? The
42. See Edward's of Byrnes Downs v. Charleston Sheet Metal Co., 253 S.C. 537,
542, 172 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1970).
43. See 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986) (eco-
nomic loss rule applies when only damage is economic and aesthetic). In this case Water-
mark never contended that the roof leaked, only that the underlying tar paper was dam-
aged. The court noted that it is always necessary to replace old tar paper when replacing
shingles, and that such an expense was recoverable in a warranty action. Consequently,
no action in negligence was allowed. Id. at 1187-88.
44. Carolina Winds, 297 S.C. at 80, 374 S.E.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
45. 297 S.C. 142, 375 S.E.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1988).
[Vol. 41
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court reiterated its view that a person does not have to use the word
"thief' specifically to make himself vulnerable to a slander per se ac-
tion, as long as the meaning of the words he used is clear. The opinion
also explored the requirements of pleading in the law of slander, ad-
ding some informative comments on procedure.4
Mr. and Mrs. Charles P. Mains were stopped for questioning as
they were leaving a K Mart department store. Mr. Mains was wearing
a jacket his wife had bought him at a different K Mart and the jacket
still contained a straight pin. After noticing the straight pin and ob-
serving Mrs. Mains buttoning the sleeves of the jacket for her husband,
a K Mart employee inferred that the Mains had taken the jacket from
a rack in the store. The employee did not directly accuse Mr. Mains of
shoplifting; however, he repeatedly asked Mr. Mains to explain the
presence of the pin. When Mr. Mains realized the store official thought
he had stolen the jacket, he became outraged and tempers flared on
both sides.
47
The confrontation lasted almost an hour and moved from the
front of the store to a back office. As a result, the Mains brought suit
46. See id. at 145-47, 375 S.E.2d at 313-14. The court noted two deficiencies in
procedure. First, K Mart's attorneys failed to make a formal motion for a directed ver-
dict at the close of the evidence. The judge simply indicated he would "[n]ote the usual
motions and mark them heard." Id. at 145, 375 S.E.2d at 313. This procedure was some-
times used before adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure in 1985. Pre-
viously, post-trial motions had to be argued before the end of a term of court. By mark-
ing the motion "heard," the judge could receive written memoranda and consider them
before issuing a decision. H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE
391 (1985).
The new rules provide that the motion for a directed verdict shall be made at the
close of all the evidence and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV)
shall be made after the jury renders its verdict. S.C. R. Civ. P. 50(a)-(b). In the case of a
motion for JNOV, the attorney has the option to argue the motion when made or to ask
for time to file a brief in support of the motion. S.C. R. Civ. P. 50(e). As in the federal
courts, a motion for JNOV cannot be made if a motion for directed verdict has not been
made at the close of all the testimony. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 50(b). In this case, K Mart's
attorneys never moved for directed verdict at that time, although they had moved for
directed verdict at the end of plaintiffs case. Since they had not made or argued a mo-
tion for directed verdict at the end of all the testimony, the court held the record was
insufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Mains, 297 S.C.
at 146, 375 S.E.2d at 313. Since K Mart's attorneys had properly argued a motion for
directed verdict at the end of the plaintiffs case, however, the court considered the is-
sues raised at that point in the trial.
The second procedural deficiency was that K Mart's answer did not specifically chal-
lenge the plaintiffs failure to plead innuendo, nor did K Mart bring that failure to the
judge's attention at trial. The court noted that "[t]he trial judge was not given an oppor-
tunity to pass on this issue and it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Id. at
146-47, 375 S.E.2d at 314.
47. Mains, 297 S.C. at 143-44, 375 S.E.2d at 312.
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against K Mart, charging the store with slander, false imprisonment,
assault and battery, and invasion of privacy. A jury found for the
Mains on the slander action and for K Mart on the other causes of
action. K Mart appealed."'
K Mart challenged the adequacy of the pleadings, arguing that an
accusation of shoplifting was never made directly, and, therefore, that
the plaintiffs should have been required to plead and prove innuendo.49
Also, K Mart contended that both the common law and the South Car-
olina Code 0 provide a privilege defense to the action. The court up-
held the jury's decision, noting that South Carolina law has never re-
quired a literal accusation of crime as the basis of an action for slander
per se, that both the common law and the statutory privilege relied on
by K Mart could be lost if exceeded by unreasonable behavior, and
that the question of reasonableness was for the jury. 1
Unlike ordinary defamation actions, slander per se requires no
proof of actual damages.5 2 Damages are presumed if the alleged slander
falls into one of the following four categories: (1) imputation of crimi-
nal behavior; (2) imputation of a loathsome disease; (3) imputation of
behavior affecting the plaintiff's business; and (4) imputation of un-
chastity of a woman.53 South Carolina cases support the idea that alle-
gations of shoplifting constitute slander per se and that the charge
does not have to be stated literally, but may be conveyed by the im-
pression the words give those that hear them. 4 These cases follow the
48. See id.
49. Innuendo is a pleading term required in situations in which the alleged slander
is not clearly defamatory. The "innuendo" is the explanation of the statement's meaning.
See id. at 146, 375 S.E.2d at 313.
50. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976). This section provides:
In any action brought by reason of having been delayed by a merchant or
merchant's employee or agent on or near the premises of a mercantile estab-
lishment for the purpose of investigation concerning the ownership of any mer-
chandise, it shall be a defense to such action if: (1) the person was delayed in a
reasonable manner and for a reasonable time to permit such investigation, and
(2) reasonable cause existed to believe that the person delayed had committed
the crime of shoplifting.
Id.
51. Mains, 297 S.C. at 149-50, 375 S.E.2d at 315.
52. Wardlaw v. Peck, 282 S.C. 199, 209, 318 S.E.2d 270, 276 (Ct. App. 1984).
53. See id. at 209, 318 S.E.2d at 276-77.
54. See, e.g., Davis v. Niederhoff, 246 S.C. 192, 143 S.E.2d 367 (1965) (statement
that there was a shortage of wood in lumberyard under plaintiff's management and that
this situation was similar to another in which there had been a strong suspicion of crime
held actionable); Flowers v. Price, 192 S.C. 373, 375, 6 S.E.2d 750, 751 (1940) (statement
that someone had stolen thirty pounds of another man's tobacco "and how do we know
you did not take [it]?" constituted charge of crime); Norton v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
184 S.C. 525, 193 S.E. 126 (1937) (statement to clerk that he had undercharged a relative
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majority of jurisdictions, which have adopted the view that the test for
slander is "the effect the language is fairly calculated to produce and
the impression it would naturally engender in the minds of the [hear-
ers].""5 "The test is whether the words, taken in the sense in which
they are reasonably understood under the circumstances by persons fa-
miliar with the language, are capable of a defamatory construction.""6
Thus, even though K Mart's employees carefully avoided direct accusa-
tions of shoplifting, the jury still could find slander per se on the facts
presented.
One problem in slander actions is the confusion between the terms
"slanderous per se" and "slander per se." While the terms appear sy-
nonymous, and often are used interchangeably, they are technically
different.57 "Slanderous per se" refers to statements that are so clear
and unambiguous that there is little debate as to their meaning, while
slander per se denotes a type of slander that is actionable without
proof of damages.58 Statements can be clearly defamatory and yet not
fall into one of the categories actionable without proof of special dam-
ages. The question of a statement's clarity or directness is not the same
as the question of its actionability. With respect to the law of slander,
however, this distinction has not been maintained clearly by South
Carolina courts."
for a sack of meal and that he could go home was an accusation of crime); Merritt v.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 179 S.C. 474, 184 S.E. 145 (1936) (statement that customer
must return to store to identify clerk from whom she bought flour held an imputation of
larceny); Lily v. Belk's Dep't Store, 178 S.C. 278, 182 S.E. 889 (1935) (clerk who grabbed
customer's package and opened it to check for missing goods committed slander); Rowell
v. Johnson, 170 S.C. 205, 170 S.E. 151 (1933) (statement to clerk that she was short in
her register and that she need not return constituted accusation of crime); Turner v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 165 S.C. 253, 163 S.E. 796 (1932) (statement that plaintiff had
taken goods under false pretenses held actionable); But see Drakeford v. Dixie Home
Stores, 233 S.C. 519, 105 S.E.2d 711 (1958) (question directed to customer asking if she
had paid for coffee she had in her bag held insufficient to impute crime).
55. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 14 (1987).
56. 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and Slander § 15 (1970). See also Lily, 178 S.C. at 282,
182 S.E. at 890.
57. E.g., Altoona Clay Prods., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 367 F.2d 625, 629 (3d Cir.
1966); see, e.g., Lent v. Hunton, 143 Vt. 539, 470 A.2d 1162 (1983); Martin v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
58. Martin, 15 Wis. 2d at 459, 113 N.W.2d at 139.
59. See, e.g., Lily, 178 S.C. at 283, 182 S.E. at 891. The Lily court used the term
"slanderous per se" correctly to refer to the clarity of a statement's meaning, stating:
Whether the langauge used is defamatory depends upon the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. If it is slanderous per se-that is, slanderous
in itself-it needs no explanation or interpretation pleaded by way of innu-
endo, and carries with it the "presumption of falsity, of damages, and, if not
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Underlying the confusion between these two terms is the question
of whether a defamatory statement is so clear that it can be called
"slanderous per se." The usual test is "whether the communication is
reasonably understood in a defamatory sense by the recipient" and
whether the meaning given the words is that "which is ordinarily at-
tached to them by persons familiar with the language used."60 If the
statement does not meet this test, it may still constitute slander if the
plaintiff can show that there are certain extrinsic circumstances which,
if known, would render the defamatory meaning clear to the hearer.6
If the extrinsic circumstances must be explained, then the pleading re-
quirements become very technical and the plaintiff must aver the "in-
ducement" (the explanation of extrinsic facts) and the "innuendo" (the
resulting meaning of the statement).,2 If the statement does not point
clearly to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff also must plead and prove the
"colloquium" (the facts which link the statement to the plaintiff).6 3
These technical requirements have received much criticism. In
Mains the court defined innuendo, stressing that it "is a pleading
term"6' and that the absence of "innuendo" in a complaint will not be
fatal to the cause of action if there is an "allegation of fact . . . suffi-
cient in itself to allege slander per se."'65 The court found the plaintiffs
complaint sufficient in its allegations.66 In fact, the plaintiff's com-
plaint alleged that K Mart, through its employees, accused him of at-
tempting to take merchandise from its store and of "being a shoplifter
and a thief.
6 7
While these allegations are the substance of what K-Mart's em-
Just because a statement is slanderous per se, however, does not mean that it carries
with it a presumption of damages. See Martin, 15 Wis. 2d at 459, 113 N.W.2d at 135.
The Lily court did not differentiate clearly the issue of the statement's clarity from the
issue of the statement's content.
This confusion also is present in Mains. Citing Lily, the respondents addressed the
problem of meaning, but used "slanderous per se" synonymously with "slander per se."
K Mart made an effort to clarify this distinction, stating that the respondents had "con-
fus[ed] the very distinct requirements that a slanderous publication be both libelous
[i.e., slanderous per se] and actionable [i.e., slander per se]." Reply Brief of Appellant at
3-4. The court, however, made no mention of this distinction.
For a discussion of this distinction in the context of an action for libel, see Capps v.
Watts, 271 S.C. 276, 281, 246 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1978) ("If a publication is not both
libelous and actionable, a cause of action cannot lie.").
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 comment c (1976).
61. Id. § 563 comment e.
62. Id. § 563 comment f.
63. Id.
64. Mains, 297 S.C. at 146, 375 S.E.2d at 313.
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ployee said, they are not the exact words the employee used. The prob-
lem K Mart faced was that no matter how tactful its employee was, the
import of his language was clear as interpreted by the Mains. More-
over, the technical pleading requirements are not necessary when the
meaning of the words, taken in the context they are uttered, is clear.
The second question on appeal concerned K Mart's assertion that
it had a statutory privilege" to detain customers to investigate the
ownership of articles in their possession and a common law privilege to
make a defamatory communication about a customer to an appropriate
third party in the reasonable protection of its property interest.69 The
common law privilege exists as a defense in a slander action, but may
be lost by an unreasonable exercise of the privilege. When a defendant
has a privilege defense, the plaintiff must show that the defendant ac-
ted with malice. Malice in this context does not necessarily mean ill
will, but implies that the defendant has acted recklessly or with con-
scious disregard for the plaintiff's rights.70 Whether the defendant has
acted recklessly is a question for the jury, and if malice is found the
defense of privilege is lost.
Whatever hope K Mart had that the South Carolina statutory
privilege would provide a stronger defense to this action than the com-
mon law privilege was dashed by the court, which viewed South Caro-
lina Code section 16-13-140 as simply a codification of the basic com-
mon law qualified privilege.7 1 For this statute to serve as a defense, a
merchant's detention of a shopper must be based on reasonable cause,
must be handled in a reasonable manner and must not exceed a rea-
sonable time.72 The court has overturned a verdict for the plaintiff in
only one case arising under this statute, Faulkenberry v. Spring Mills,
Inc.7 3 In the other cases, which involved detentions of nearly an hour
when no one had actually seen the suspected shoplifter take anything,
the court consistently has deferred to the decision of the jury."'
Thus, merchants, and attorneys who advise them, should not view
the existence of this statute or the common law privilege to detain as
solving potential liability problems with respect to detentions of sus-
pected shoplifters. Furthermore, after Mains it is clear that a policy of
avoiding direct accusations of shoplifting will not prevent plaintiffs
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976), see supra note 50.
69. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 115, at 825 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
70. Padgett v. Sun News, 278 S.C. 26, 32, 292 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1982).
71. See Mains, 297 S.C. at 150, 375 S.E.2d at 315.
72. See id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
73. 271 S.C. 377, 247 S.E.2d 445 (1978).
74. See, e.g., Mains, 297 S.C. 142, 375 S.E.2d 311; Gathers v. Harris-Teeter Super-
market, 282 S.C. 220, 317 S.E.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1984).
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from prevailing in slander actions when the merchant's language per-
mits defamatory construction.
Susan M. Glenn
IV. DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK DISTINGUISHED AND SCOPE OF
APPLICATION BROADENED
In Senn v. Sun Printing Co. 7 5 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals continued its efforts to distinguish the doctrines of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk and broadened the scope of assump-
tion of risk by applying it as a matter of law. In formulating a compre-
hensive definition of the doctrine, the court established the following
requirements for asserting assumption of risk: "(1) the plaintiff has
knowledge of the facts constituting a dangerous condition, (2) he
knows the condition is dangerous, (3) he appreciates the nature and
extent of the danger, and (4) he voluntarily exposes himself to the dan-
ger." 76 The court found uncontradicted evidence that the plaintiff had
met all four elements, thereby entitling the defendant to a directed
verdict.
This premises liability suit arose after Florence Senn sustained in-
juries in a parking lot maintained jointly by Sun Printing Company
(Sun) and Bowers and Floyd, Inc. (Bowers). The parking lot located
behind these two businesses had not been resurfaced since 1965 and its
asphalt surface had developed large potholes. Additionally, evidence
indicated that the crumbling edges of the potholes created a dangerous
situation.
7 7
Senn parked her truck in the lot and made business visits to the
offices of both Bowers and Sun. While attempting to return to her
truck, Senn fell into a pothole and was injured when the edge of the
pothole along which she was walking apparently crumbled. Senn testi-
fied that she knew the potholes were dangerous and had walked along
the edge in an attempt to avoid them. On cross examination, however,
she stated that although an alternative route to her truck existed, she
decided to confront the potholes rather than go out of her way.78
During trial Bowers moved for both a directed verdict and a judg-
ment non obstante veredicto based on the defense of assumption of
risk. The trial judge overruled both motions and submitted the case to
the jury. The jury returned a verdict against Bowers and Sun. Sun
75. 295 S.C. 169, 367 S.E.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1988).
76. Id. at 173, 367 S.E.2d at 458.
77. Id. at 170-72, 367 S.E.2d at 456-58.
78. Id. at 173, 367 S.E.2d at 458.
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moved for and was granted a new trial on damages only. Bowers ap-
pealed the decision . 9 The court of appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that because Senn knew the condition was dangerous, appreci-
ated the nature and extent of the danger, voluntarily exposed herself
to that danger, and no evidence existed to contradict these facts, the
trial court erred in not granting Bowers' motions.80
This case represents the continuing effort to draw a clear distinc-
tion between the often blurred doctrines of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence in South Carolina. Previously, courts used
these two doctrines almost interchangeably. In Baker v. Clark"1 the
court stated that "[t]here is some confusion in the cases as to whether
a defense of this kind should be characterized as contributory negli-
gence or assumption of risk. '8 2 Rather than taking steps to eliminate
this confusion, however, the court decided that "[flor the purpose of
determining . . . whether the Court erred in directing a verdict, it
makes little difference whether we call the defense under discussion
assumption of-the risk or contributory negligence."8' 3 This ambiguity
also was evident in House v. European Health Spa,8' in which the
court found that the plaintiff "heedlessly proceeded to expose herself
to the risk presented," but subsequently held that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent.
8 5
In 1984 the court of appeals began to clarify this confusion in Grif-
fin v. Griffin.86 The court in Griffin switched its emphasis to identifica-
tion of the legal doctrines and their characteristics and away from the
effect their application might have on the outcome of the case. Griffin
was the first case to consider and rule on the two doctrines separately.
The court reformulated a general definition of assumption of risk, stat-
ing, "'The fundamental consideration underlying the doctrine . . . is
that one should not be permitted knowingly and voluntarily to incur
an obvious risk of harm when he has the ability to avoid doing so, and
79. Id. at 170-71, 367 S.E.2d at 456-57.
80. Id. at 173, 367 S.E.2d at 458-59.
81. 233 S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395 (1958).
82. Id. at 25, 103 S.E.2d at 397.
83. Id.
84. 269 S.C. 644, 239 S.E.2d 653 (1977).
85. Id. at 648, 239 S.E.2d at 655; see also King v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 278 S.C. 350,
296 S.E.2d 335 (1982) (court discussing plaintiffs contributory negligence despite its
statement that plaintiff knew of the risk and exposed himself to a known danger); Powell
v. Bonitz Insulation Co., 273 S.C. 98, 254 S.E.2d 311 (1979) (stating plaintiff was aware
of potential risk yet chose to confront it, court held plaintiff contributorily negligent);
Bolen v. Strange, 192 S.C. 284, 6 S.E.2d 466 (1939) (meat shop employee found guilty of
contributory negligence despite language indicating that he assumed the risk).
86. 282 S.C. 288, 318 S.E.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1984).
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then hold another person responsible for his injury.' ,s Griffin, how-
ever, did not expressly state the difference between assumption of risk
and contributory negligence.
Two years later, in Broom v. Southeastern Highway Contracting
Co.,88 the court of appeals drew a direct distinction between the doc-
trines. The court stated that "[u]nlike contributory negligence, which
is based on carelessness, inadvertence, and unintended events, 'as-
sumption of risk requires an intelligent and deliberate choice to as-
sume a known risk.'-89
Senn advances the court's clarification of these legal doctrines by
following the general definition in Griffin and expressly creating a four
element test for proving assumption of risk. These explicit require-
ments clearly set the doctrine apart from contributory negligence and
should eliminate most of the confusion surrounding the two defenses.
The new test comports with the generally accepted definition and
aligns South Carolina with the majority of jurisdictions.8 0
While clarifying the definition and application of assumption of
risk, Senn also broadened the scope of the doctrine by applying it as a
matter of law.91 Prior to this decision, South Carolina courts were re-
luctant to make this determination, preferring instead to allow the
question to go to the jury. For example, in Coker v. Piggly Wiggly,"2 a
slip and fall case involving a wet exit ramp, the supreme court affirmed
a trial court's denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion, stating
that while the plaintiff "knowingly exposed himself to the risk
presented by a wet ramp, . . . [it did not appear that he] knew the
extent of the danger posed.1 3 The court again refused to apply the
defense as a matter of law in Merriman v. Sea Pines Plantation Co.
9 4
The court in Merriman stated that "[w]hile the fact that the ramp was
wet was observed by the plaintiff, he did not observe its deceptively
slippery condition."' 5 More recently, the court of appeals discussed the
possibility of applying the doctrine as a matter of law in Griffin and
Broom, but declined to do so in both instances.
In Senn, the court took the extra step, applying its four new re-
quirements. The court stated:
87. Id. at 294, 318 S.E.2d at 28-29 (quoting 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 174(1) (1966)).
88. 291 S.C. 93, 352 S.E.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1986).
89. Id. at 101, 352 S.E.2d at 306 (quoting 7A AM. Jup. 2D Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 425 (1980)).
90. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 69, § 69.
91. See Senn, 295 S.C. at 173, 367 S.E.2d at 459.
92. 274 S.C. 55, 261 S.E.2d 699 (1979).
93. Id. at 57, 261 S.E.2d at 700.
94. 278 S.C. 263, 294 S.E.2d 423 (1982).
95. Id. at 266, 294 S.E.2d at 425.
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The uncontradicted evidence of record is that Senn (1) saw the
potholes, (2) knew the potholes were dangerous, (3) intentionally
walked on the edge of a pothole to get to her truck which she had
parked over a pothole, and (4) could have parked her truck in a safe
area or avoided walking on the edge of the pothole while returning to
her truck .... 91
By applying assumption of risk per se, the court refrained from finding
any "deceptive dangers" or unforseen circumstances that might have
justified sending the case to the jury.
The court of appeals in Senn once again displayed its effort to
take a purely legalistic approach to the law in South Carolina. By es-
tablishing both a general definition and the elements of proof for as-
sumption of risk, the court has erased most of the confusion surround-
ing this defense. Additionally, by applying the doctrine as a matter of
law using the new elements of proof, actions constituting assumption
of risk have become readily identifiable.
Mark E. Rostick
V. COURT HOLDS FACTS OF CASE DID NOT ESTABLISH "NEGLIGENT
APPRAISAL" DEFENSE, BUT INDICATES WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE
DEFENSE WHEN ELEMENTS PROVED
In First Federal Savings Bank v. Knauss97 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals addressed the issues of whether appraisals adopted
by a bank for mortgage loans were negligently made, and if so, whether
"negligent appraisal" was a valid defense to bar deficiency judgments
upon foreclosure of the mortgages. The court held that the plaintiff
failed to prove the appraisals were negligently made, and therefore, he
could not use the defense of "negligent appraisal" against the defi-
ciency judgments 8
In March 1984 Donald R. Knauss executed five promissory notes
and mortgages, each for $64,000, in favor of Gulfstream Mortgage
Company. Each note was secured by one of five lots in the "Caliboque
Square Subdivison." Gulfstream subsequently assigned the notes and
mortgages to First Federal.99
The dispute arose over appraisals performed in 1983, which were
the basis for Knauss' loan. The appraisals estimated the five undevel-
oped lots to be worth $80,000, provided the lots would be developed as
96. Senn, 295 S.C. at 173, 367 S.E.2d at 459.
97. 296 S.C. 136, 370 S.E.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1988).
98. Id. at 141, 370 S.E.2d at 909.
99. Id. at 138, 370 S.E.2d at 907.
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planned.100 A business associate of Knauss' obtained the appraisals,
and the bank used the appraisals to satisfy the loan requirements. In
March of 1986, after the notes were in default, another appraiser as-
signed a market value of $40,000 for each lot.
10'
Knauss contended the bank was negligent in appraising the lots
and that he relied on them to his detriment in purchasing the proper-.
ties. Thus, he argued the land should be the only source of recovery for
First Federal.10 2 A special referee agreed with Knauss and recom-
mended that he be granted a setoff of $120,000 if deficiencies resulted
after foreclosure.10s The trial court rejected the referee's recommenda-
tions and held that South Carolina courts have not recognized a "negli-
gent appraisal" defense in mortgage foreclosure actions. Furthermore,
the lower court held that even if this defense were recognized, the facts
in this case did not establish the defense. 04 Knauss appealed the deci-
sion. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that Knauss had not
proved he had relied upon the appraisals or that the appraisals were
negligently performed."0 5 The court indicated, however, that "negligent
appraisal" is a viable defense in South Carolina. 06
The court equated the concepts of negligent misrepresentation
and negligent appraisal, noting an earlier decision in which it con-
cluded that a duty exists to exercise due care in giving information
"when the defendant had a pecuniary interest in the transaction." 02 In
finding the facts of Knauss not to have established "negligent ap-
praisal," the court implied that at least the following three elements
must be proved to support a "negligent appraisal" defense: 1) the ap-
praisal was negligently made; 2) the appraisal was supplied by an em-
ployee of the lending institution; and 3) the purchaser relied on the
100. Id. at 138-39, 370 S.E.2d at 907.
101. Id. at 139, 370 S.E.2d at 907.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 138, 370 S.E.2d at 907.
104. Id. at 138, 139, 370 S.E.2d at 907, 908.
105. Id. at 141, 370 S.E.2d at 909.
106. See id. at 140-41, 370 S.E.2d at 908-09.
107. Id. at 140, 370 S.E.2d at 908 (citing Winburn v. Insurance Co. of N. Amer., 287
S.C. 435, 339 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1985)). The court supported its implicit recognition of
the "negligent appraisal" defense and its comparison of that defense to the concept of
negligent misrepresentation by citing the latter as it is described in Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. Id. The Restatement reads in pertinent part:
One who, in the course of business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false informa-
tion for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to lia-
bility for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
or communicating the information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
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appraisal to his detriment in purchasing the property.'0 8
In an attempt to persuade the court to extend the theory of negli-
gent misrepresentation to encompass the principle of negligent ap-
praisal, Knauss relied primarily on an Iowa case, Larson v. United
Federal Savings and Loan Association.10 9 In Larson an employee of
the lender performed an appraisal and the borrowers relied on the ap-
praisal in purchasing their home. Lay and expert testimony established
that the appraisal was negligently performed, since it did not take into
account the structural defects of the house. In holding the lender lia-
ble, the court referred to the principle of negligent misrepresentation
established in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.110 The
court concluded that since the appraisal was performed by an em-
ployee of the lender, the lender owed a duty of due care to the bor-
rower or relying party."1 1 The court of appeals in Knauss apparently
was persuaded by the Iowa court's reasoning in Larson, but distin-
guished the facts of that case from Knauss by stating that unlike Lar-
son, in which the appraiser was an employee of the lender, the ap-
praiser in Knauss did not work for First Federal.1 2
Several other jurisdictions have recognized "negligent appraisal"
or negligent misrepresentation in cases factually similar to Knauss.' 3
For instance, in Wolther v. Schaarschmidt,n1 a Colorado case, the
court of appeals invoked Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552 to
reverse summary judgment granted in favor of a lender that approved
an inaccurate appraisal.1 5 Additionally, the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals in Costa v. Neimon n 8 expressly discussed "negligent appraisal."
In Costa the court held the appraiser retained by the lender was liable
to a purchaser/borrower for the negligent appraisal of the property.
Even though the purchaser had not seen the appraisal prior to
purchasing the property, the court found the purchaser had a right to
rely on the appraisal because approval of the loan indicated the result
of the appraisal.'1
Since the principle of negligent appraisal on the part of a lender
108. See Knauss, 296 S.C. at 141, 370 S.E.2d at 909.
109. 300 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1981).
110. RESTATEzMENT, supra note 107.
111. See Larson, 300 N.W.2d at 287-88.
112. Knauss, 296 S.C. at 141, 370 S.E.2d at 908.
113. See, e.g., Wolther v. Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Schanz
v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 165 Mich. App. 395, 418 N.W.2d 478 (1988); Strauna v. Wolf,
126 Misc. 2d 1031, 484 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Costa v. Neimon, 123 Wis. 2d 410,
366 N.W.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1985).
114. 738 P.2d 25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
115. Id. at 28.
116. 123 Wis. 2d 410, 366 N.W.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1985).
117. See id. at 416, 366 N.W.2d at 900.
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arguably is inconsistent with the objective of the lender to protect it-
self, several cases have resulted in courts refusing to recognize this de-
fense. These cases, however, generally involved federally insured mort-
gagors who sued the government for negligent appraisals performed by
the Federal Housing Authority (FHA).1 8 Courts considering such cases
almost unanimously have held the government not liable. The United
States Supreme Court reversed one of the few decisions to hold other-
wise in United States v. Newstadt.119 The Court stated:
[Congress] repeatedly emphasized that the primary and predominant
objective of the appraisal system was the "protection of the Govern-
ment and its insurance funds"; that the mortgage insurance program
was not designed to insure anything other than the repayment of
loans made by lendor-mortgages; and that "there is no legal relation-
ship between the FHA and the individual mortgagor." Never once was
it even intimated that, by an FHA appraisal, the Government would,
in any sense, represent or guarantee to the purchaser, that he was re-
ceiving a certain value for his money.'20
The Court's reasoning in Newstadt arguably should be applied to
private lenders as well as government lenders, since lending institu-
tions similarly use appraisals primarily to insure that their loans will
be secured. Nevertheless, the South Carolina Court of Appeals in
Knauss clearly has indicated that by an extension of the concept of
negligent misrepresentation, this state will recognize "negligent ap-
praisal" defenses when the elements of the defense are proved.
Virginia C. Tate
118. See, e.g., Summers v. United States, 510 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 851 (1975); Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Chelsea
Towers, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1242 (D.N.J. 1967); Choy v. Farragut Gardens 1, Inc., 131 F.
Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
119. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
120. Id. at 709 (footnotes omitted).
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